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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Woodall does not dispute Reynolds' statement of the basis for appellate jurisdiction. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a dismissal pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the 
court assumes the factual allegations in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable 
inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bemeau v. Martino, 223 P.3d 1128, 
1130 (Utah.2009). The Court further reviews the trial court's decision for correctness without 
deference to its findings. Whipple v. American Fork Irr. Co.. 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 
(Utah. 1996). However, the Court should find dismissal justified when the allegations of the 
complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim. Id. at 1220. 
STATUTORY PROVISION OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
57-1 -22. Successor trustees - Appointment by beneficiary - Effect - Substitution of trustee 
— Recording — Form. 
(1) (a) The beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record 
in the office of the county recorder of each county in which the trust property or some part 
of the trust property is situated, a substitution of trustee. 
(b) The new trustee shall succeed to all the power, duties, authority, and title of the 
trustee named in the deed of trust and of any successor trustee. 
(c) The beneficiary may, by express provision in the substitution of trustee, ratify and 
confirm action taken on the beneficiary's behalf by the new trustee prior to the recording of 
the substitution of trustee. 
(2) The substitution shall: 
(a) identify the trust deed by stating: 
(i) the names of the original parties to the trust deed; 
(ii) the date of recordation; and 
(iii) (A) the book and page where the trust deed is recorded; or 
(B) the entry number; 
(b) include the legal description of the trust property; 
(c) state the name and address of the new trustee; and 
(d) be executed and acknowledged by all of the beneficiaries under the trust deed or 
their successors in interest. 
-1-
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(3) (a) If not previously recorded at the time of recording a notice of default, the 
successor trustee shall file for record, in the office of the county recorder of each county in 
which the trust property or some part of it is situated, the substitution of trustee. 
(b) A copy of the substitution of trustee shall be sent in the manner provided in 
Subsection 57-1-26(2) to any: 
(i) person who requests a copy of any notice of default or notice of sale under 
Subsection 57-l-26(l)(a); and 
(ii) person who is a party to the trust deed to whom a copy of a notice of default would 
be required to be mailed by Subsection 57-1-26(3). 
(4) A substitution of trustee shall be in substantially the following form: 
Substitution of Trustee 
(insert name and address of new trustee) 
is hereby appointed successor trustee under the trust deed executed by as trustor, 
in which is named beneficiary and as trustee, and filed for record 
(month\day\year), and recorded in Book , Page , Records of 
County, (or filed for record (month\day\year), with recorder's entry No. , 
County), Utah. 
(Insert legal description) 
Signature • 
(Certificate of Acknowledgment) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Woodall does not dispute the procedural summary of the proceedings in the trial court 
set forth in Reynolds' Opening Brief. Woodall offers the following supplement to the facts 
numbered as 18, 22, and 31 in Reynolds' Opening Brief. 
Reynolds' Fact Number 18: The Notice of Default dated April 15,2009, and recorded 
April 16,2009, specifies that Woodall is acting as Trustee under the HELOC Deed of Trust, 
identifies Citibank Federal Savings Bank as the Beneficiary, declares a default in payments 
by the Plaintiff, and specifies that by reason of the default, "Beneficiary has instructed the 
Trustee to.cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obligations secured thereby." 
Reynolds' Fact Number 22: The Notice of Trustee's Sale posted on the front door of 
the real property at issued specified that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale would take place on 
-2-
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September 16,2009, and further specifies that "The current beneficiary of the Trust Deed as 
of the date of this notice is CITIBANK FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK." 
Reynolds' Fact Number 31: The Substitution of Trustee dated October 30,2009, and 
executed by Citibank Federal Savings Bank ("Citibank'1) contains the following language 
above the signature of the beneficiary: 'The undersigned Beneficiary hereby ratifies and 
confirms any and all actions taken on the beneficiary's behalf by the Successor Trustee prior 
to the recording of the Substitution of Trustee." 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The case at bar involves the authority of a beneficiary under a deed of trust to ratify 
and confirm actions taken by a substituted trustee prior to the recording of that Substitution 
of Trustee in the official records of the County, granted in Utah Code 57-1-22(1 )(c). This 
Court should affirm the trial court's order of dismissal and judgment in favor of Appellee 
James H. Woodall ("Woodall") because Reynolds misapprehends the statutory section at 
issue, and her interpretation would in essence eliminate the ratification authority from Title 
57 of the Utah Code. 
Reynolds9 argument that Woodall became the substituted trustee by an oral 
substitution of trustee is factually wrong and rebutted by the documents she presented to the 
trial court in her original and amended complaints. Utah Code 57-1-22(2) specifies the 
manner in which a trustee under the original deed of trust can be substituted, including the 
exact language of the substitution that parties can utilize to comply with the statute. Reynolds 
attached the written substitution of trustee appointing Woodall as trustee as an exhibit to her 
-3-
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complaints, and no good faith dispute exists that the writing is executed by the beneficiary 
or that it fails to set forth all of the information required by Utah Code 57-1-22(2). Instead, 
Reynolds' actual dispute thus relates to the timing of a beneficiary's ratification of acts by 
a substitute trustee and the scope of the authority to ratify and confirm under Utah Code 57-
l-22(l)(c). This does not constitute a statute of frauds issue, but an issue of interpreting the 
scope of the ratification authority. Therefore, the statue of frauds argument is non sequitur. 
The remainder of Reynolds' arguments represent an attempt to read the ratification 
authority set forth in Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c) out of the statutory scheme governing 
nonjudicial foreclosures. Reynolds essentially argues that a substitution of trustee cannot 
ratify action taken prior to its recording, and that the only remedy for a beneficiary or trustee 
who fails to record the substitution of trustee contemporaneous with the Notice of Default 
is to re-start the nonjudicial foreclosure process. However, the authority to ratify In Utah 
Code 57-l-22(l)(c) contemplates that a Substitution of Trustee was not recorded prior to 
actions taken by the trustee, such as the recording of a Notice of Default or issuance of a 
Notice of Trustee's Sale. If a foreclosure process became void due to the failure to serve a 
signed Substitution of Trustee concurrent with the Notice of Default, it would render the 
authority of the beneficiary to ratify the actions taken by a trustee moot. Neither Utah Code 
57-l-22(l)(c) nor Utah decisional authority provide for this result. On this basis, the trial 
court correctly dismissed Reynolds' first amended complaint without leave to amend, and 
this Court should affirm that judgment on appeal. 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
L REYNOLDS5 STATUE OF FRAUDS ARGUMENT HAS NO MERIT 
BECAUSE THE RECORDED SUBSTITUTION OF TRUSTEE APPOINTING 
WOOD ALL SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE 57-1-22(2) 
Reynolds' contention that an oral substitution of Woodall as the trustee under the 
second priority deed of trust occurred contradicts the recorded Substitution of Trustee that 
she attached to her amended complaint. Her complaint did not contain any allegation that 
Woodall became the substituted trustee by an oral agreement only. Even if she could have 
proffered that theory as a basis to further amend her complaint, it would not have constituted 
a well-plead fact that the trial court had to consider as true for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion because she attached the actual substitution as an exhibit to her original and first 
amended complaint. As discussed herein, the recorded Substitution of Trustee complies with 
the specific statutory provision governing the contents of such documents and demonstrates 
compliance with the statute of frauds as a matter of law. 
The Court need not refer to the general statute of frauds statute or non-foreclosure law 
decisional authority to evaluate if the recorded substitution satisfies the statute of frauds 
under Utah law. Instead, Utah Code 57-1 -22 sets forth the requirement of a recorded writing 
signed by the beneficiary for an effective assignment. Subsection (2) specifies that a 
substitution of trustee shall (a) identify the trust deed by stating: (i) the names of the original 
parties to the trust deed; (ii) the date of recordation; and, (iii) (A) the book and page where 
the trust deed is recorded; or (B) the entry number; (b) include the legal description of the 
trust property; (c) state the name and address of the new trustee; and, (d) be executed and 
-5-
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acknowledged by all of the beneficiaries under the trust deed or their successors in interest. 
The substitution of trustee executed by Citibank Federal Savings Bank ("Citibank") 
appointing Woodall includes all of this required information and is in a writing recorded in 
the official records of Salt Lake County. Reynolds does not dispute that the Substitution 
contains all of the requisite information. 
Reynolds' nevertheless argues that the trial court had to ignore this writing as a matter 
of law because the date of its execution, without regard to its contents. This does not 
constitute a colorable argument that the Substitution of Trustee appointing Mr. Woodall 
failed to comply with the Utah statute of frauds. Instead, her statute of frauds argument is 
simply a variant of her legal theory that Utah law does not permit a beneficiary to ratify the 
actions taken by a trustee prior to the recording of the substitution of trustee. As set forth in 
the next section, this argument runs contrary to the plain language of Utah Code 57-1-
22(1 )(c), and attempts to read the ratification authority out of the Utah Code entirely. Her 
stand-alone argument that an oral substitution of trustee occurred has no factual or legal 
support, meaning this Court should affirm the dismissal of the first amended complaint 
without leave to amend. 
II. UTAH CODE 57-1-22 EXPRESSLY PERMITS RATIFICATION OF THE 
ACTS OF A TRUSTEE BY A BENEFICIARY TAKING PLACE PRIOR TO 
THE RECORDING OF THE SUBSTITUTION OF TRUSTEE, MEANING 
REYNOLDS' ARGUMENTS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Reynolds' tortured construction of the ratification authority set forth in Utah Code 57-
l-22(l)(c) defies both norms of statutory interpretation and logic. Reynolds argues at length 
that despite the "ratify and confirm" language in this subsection, a Substitution of Trustee 
-6-
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can never cause ratification of acts taken by the trustee prior to its recording. Reynolds does 
not and cannot cite any legislative history or case law to support this proposition. In essence, 
this would read the ratification authority out of the statute. 
Reynolds grudgingly acknowledges that a Substitution of Trustee could contain a 
ratification of action taken by a trustee if the date on the Substitution of Trustee is on or 
before the Notice of Default and recorded at the same tine as the Notice of Default. However, 
this interpretation would read a provision into 57-l-22(l)(c) that the Utah legislature did not 
create. This subsection does not limit the ratification authority to acts taken prior to the 
execution date of the Substitution of Trustee; as discussed below, it allows the beneficiary 
to ratify and confirm any acts taken by the trustee prior to the recording of the Substitution. 
A. Reynolds' Contention that the Trial Court Failed to Consider Utah Code 57-1-
22(3) is Erroneous and Ignores the Authority to Ratify in the Same Section 
Reynolds argues at page 21 of her Opening Brief that no valid nonjudicial foreclosure 
activity can ever occur without the recording of a Substitution of Trustee, citing to the 
language of Utah Code 57-1-22(3) and claiming that the trial court failed to consider it. 
However, Reynolds fails to acknowledge the actual findings of the trial court, and that her 
rationale would eliminate the authority found earlier in that same section for a beneficiary 
to ratify and confirm acts by the trustee prior to the recording of the substitution. 
Subsection (3)(a) of Utah Code 57-1-22 addresses the requirement to record a 
substitution of trustee at the time of recording a notice of default if the substitution has not 
already been recorded. Subsection (3)(b) then addresses the requirement to sent a copy of the 
-7-
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substitution of trustee to specified persons. Reynolds interprets this section to mean that a 
notice of default cannot be issued unless a substitution of trustee is previously or 
concurrently recorded, and that failure to record the substitution makes all of the nonjudicial 
foreclosure activity void. 
This argument ignores the fact that the Utah Legislature has already addressed the 
situation in which a trustee proceeds with nonjudicial foreclosure activity before a 
Substitution of Trustee is executed and recorded. This argument is discussed in detail in 
section II.B. infra. In summary, pursuant to Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c), the Beneficiary can 
ratify the actions taken by a Trustee before the actual substitution of that Trustee: 
(c) The beneficiary may, by express provision in the substitution of trustee, 
ratify and confirm action taken on the beneficiary's behalf by the new trustee 
prior to the recording of the substitution of trustee. 
In granting Woodall's motion to dismiss, the trial court found that the authority of 
Citibank to ratify actions taken by Woodall prior to recordation of the Substitution of Trustee 
included the Notice of Default, Notice of Trustee's Sale, conducting the foreclosure sale, and 
recording the Trustee's Deed. Indeed, the authority to ratify contemplates that a Substitution 
of Trustee was not recorded prior to actions taken by the trustee, such as the recording of a 
Notice of Default or issuance of a Notice of Trustee's Sale. If a foreclosure process became 
void due to the failure to serve a signed Substitution of Trustee concurrent with the Notice 
of Default, it would render the authority of the beneficiary to ratify the actions taken by a 
trustee, including and after the Notice of Default, moot. 
-8-
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Neither Utah Code 57-1-22(1 )(c) nor Utah decisional authority provide for this result. 
Indeed, while Utah Code 57-l-22(3)(b) indicates the trustee shall serve the Substitution with 
the Notice of Default, the subsequent sections governing a Notice of Default - i.e., 57-1-23 
and 57-1-24 - do not make service of the Substitution a prerequisite for the validity of the 
Notice of Default. To find otherwise would require this Court to add statutory prerequisites 
to the Utah nonjudicial foreclosure statutory scheme that it did not deem appropriate to 
include. As a result, Reynolds' argument that the trial court erred in failing to consider Utah 
Code 57-1-22(3) is erroneous and fails to provide a basis for reversal. 
B. Reynolds9 Interpretation of the Ratification Authority Would Require this 
Court to Eliminate that Statutory Provision from Utah Code 57-1-22 
Reynolds argues that the ratification authority under Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c) "is 
precisely what it is, nothing more" (Reynolds' Brief at p. 22), and does not include the 
authority to ratify and confirm actions taken prior to the recording of the substitution of 
trustee (Reynolds' Brief at p. 23.) Reynolds further asserts in the issues of law section of her 
brief that the phrase ratify and confirm under Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c) means only to "adopt 
for one's own purposes". Reynolds' construction of Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c) is tortured and 
nonsensical because it requires this Court to ignore the plain language of the subsection and 
deprive the beneficiary of the ability to ratify and confirm. 
On June 30, 2011, this Court considered the manner and scope of ratification under 
Utah law in Franklin Credit Management v. Hannev. P.3d , 2011 WL 2567550, *8 
(June 30, 2011). The Hanney court found that it "is well-established under Utah law that 
-9-
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[subsequent affirmance by a principal of a contract made on his behalf by one who had at 
the time neither actual nor apparent authority constitutes a ratification, which in general is 
as effectual as an original authorization." Id at *8. With regard to the statute of frauds, 
Hanney noted that if "the Utah statute of frauds requires that any agent executing an 
agreement conveying an interest in land on behalf of his principal must be authorized in 
writing.. .Where the law requires the authority to be given in writing, the ratification must 
also generally be in writing." Id. 
The Utah legislature created the specific remedy for a beneficiary to utilize in the 
situation when a substitution of trustee is not recorded before foreclosure notices are issued 
by the new trustee, and also specified the required contents of the written document. Under 
Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c), the substitution of trustee can contain an express provision by the 
beneficiary to ratify and confirm action taken on the beneficiary's behalf before the recording 
of the substitution of trustee. This subsection follows subsection (l)(a), which would * 
otherwise limit the authority of a successor trustee to act unless and until the recording of the 
appointment with the County recorder. It also follows subsection (l)(b), which provides for 
the new trustee to have all the powers of the trustee named in the deed of trust. 
Therefore, the language of subsection (l)(c) of Utah Code 57-1-22 does not limit the 
authority of the beneficiary to ratify actions taken by the new trustee to only those taken 
between the execution of an appointment of successor trustee and its recording. Instead, it 
allows an express ratification and consent by the beneficiary to action "taken on the 
beneficiary's behalf by the new trustee prior to the recording of the substitution of trustee". 
-10-
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The fact that the Utah legislature specified that the Substitution of Trustee document itself 
can set forth the ratification authority indicates the specific intent to allow a cure of the 
failure to record the substitution of trustee prior to commencing nonjudicial foreclosure 
activities rather than requiring the re-initiation of the entire nonjudicial foreclosure process 
in order to cure this oversight. 
The Substitution of Trustee attached as Exhibit L to Reynolds' first amended 
complaint contains the following language above the signature of the beneficiary: "The 
undersigned Beneficiary hereby ratifies and confirms any and all actions taken on the 
beneficiary's behalf by the Successor Trustee prior to the recording of the Substitution of 
Trustee." Therefore, the record before the trial court established that Citibank expressly 
ratified the actions taken by Woodall as a Trustee within the meaning of Title 57 of the Utah 
Code. When Citibank executed the Substitution of Trustee on October 30,2009, it expressly 
ratified and confirmed "any and all actions taken on the beneficiary's behalf by the Successor 
Trustee prior to the recording of the Substitution of Trustee." As a result, Citibank ratified 
Woodall's recording of the Notice of Default, issuance of the Notice of Trustee's Sale, 
conduct of the sale on September 16,2009, and subsequent recording of the Trustee's Deed. 
The trial thus appropriately granted Woodall's motion to dismiss on the ratification issue. 
C. Reynolds' Limited Construction of Ratification Authority is Contrary to the 
Statutory Language because it Leaves to Act the Beneficiary can Ratify 
Reynolds concedes at page 24 of her Brief that Utah Code 5 7-1 -22( 1 )(c) might permit 
a beneficiary to ratify and confirm acts by a trustee done before the recording of the 
-11-
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Substitution of Trustee if that document existed at the time the foreclosure notices were 
delivered, but was simply not recorded. Under her interpretation, 57-l-22(l)(c) "applies 
during the period between the execution of a written substitution of trustee and the time that 
it can be recorded", and the substitution of trustee can only be recorded before or 
concurrently with the Notice of Default. 
Reynolds' construction of 57-1-22(c) would mean that ratification authority only 
exists if the beneficiary or trustee discovers that the Substitution of Trustee was already 
executed, but inadvertently not recorded before the Notice of Default. This would mean that 
every Substitution of Trustee would have to contain a ratification provision for acts that have 
not actually happened as of the date the substitution is executed. Further, it would eliminate 
the possibility of ratification if the beneficiary for any reason failed to execute the 
substitution of trustee prior to the new trustee delivering any notices. 
Indeed, Reynolds' construction would render the ratification authority meaningless, 
as if the substitution of trustee with the ratification provision has to be recorded with the 
Notice of Default, there is no act by the trustee that can be ratified. The mailing of the Notice 
of Default is not required until a maximum often days after its recording pursuant to Utah 
Code 57-1-26(2). As a result, accepting Reynolds' interpretation of 57-1-22(1 )(c) would 
mean there is nothing for the beneficiary to ratify as a matter of law. 
This argument contradicts the plain language of the statute at issue. Subsection (1 )(c) 
does not limit the authority of the beneficiary to confirm and ratify such action depending on 
the date of execution of the appointment of the successor trustee. If the Utah legislature 
-12-
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intended to so limit the authority to ratify and confirm, it could have used that language in 
the statute; it did not. Instead, it provides that the beneficiary could ratify and confirm any 
acts taken by the substituted trustee before the substitution is recorded. Therefore, Utah Code 
57-1-22(1 )(c) provides a remedy for the failure to record the Substitution of Trustee short of 
re-staring the nonjudicial foreclosure process, which Reynolds' impliedly argues. 
Two recent decisions issued by Federal Courts in Nevada are instructive on the 
authority of a beneficiary to ratify actions taken by a trustee prior to the recording of the 
notice of default and without regard to the date on the substitution document. These decisions 
are particularly persuasive because Nevada's nonjudicial foreclosure statutory scheme does 
not contain a similar ratification provision to Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c). In Logan v. World 
Sav. Bank, FSB, the U.S. District Court rejected the theory presented by Reynolds in the 
present case when the substitution of trustee was recorded after the notice of default: 
However, a Substitution of Trustee was filed in this matter substituting NDSC 
for Golden West Savings Association. Although this Substitution of Trustee 
was filed after the recordation of the NOD, it does represent a clear and 
unambiguous representation that either NDSC was acting on behalf of a 
proper entity, either the trustee or beneficiary, or a subsequent ratification 
of the actions taken by NDSC by the beneficiary, who executed the 
Substitution of Trustee, with regards to the recording of the NOD. In either 
event, the subsequent recordation of a Substitution of Trustee naming NDSC 
as the new trustee corrects the defect in its recording, rendering the claim 
under NRS 107.080 moot. 
See 2011 WL 1627001, *2 (D.Nev. April 26,2011) (unpublished) (emphasis added). Another 
U.S. District Court in Nevada echoed this point and specifically found that ratification under 
principles of agency made the acts of a trustee who had not yet been substituted by a written 
instrument valid: 
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Plaintiffs allege that the beneficiaries in these cases willfully proceed to 
foreclosure despite knowing that an entity that was not the trustee has filed the 
notice of default. But that willfulness is called ratification, and it cures an 
otherwise defective filing even where the purported agent was not in fact an 
agent when it acted. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.03 (f,A person 
may ratify an act if the actor acted or purported to act as an agent on the 
person's behalf." (emphasis added)). A beneficiary may therefore proceed 
with foreclosure based on the filing of a notice of default by a party that 
purported to be its agent or trustee but was not, so long as the beneficiary 
ratifies the action. "A person may ratify the act of an agent or the act of a 
person who purported to be an agent but was not." Id. at § 4.03 cmt. b. A 
later-executed substitution of trustee making the notice of default filer the 
new trustee before proceeding to sale is practically insurmountable evidence 
of ratification, and as Plaintiffs note (and in fact document in their motion), 
the beneficiaries in these cases typically execute such substitutions. 
See Nev. ex rel. Bates v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Svs.. 2011 WL 1582945, *5 (D.Nev. 
April 25,2011) (unpublished) (emphases added). Consequently, the principle that ratification 
of the actions taken by Woodall allows for authorization of nonjudicial foreclosure activities 
that pre-date the recording of the Substitution of Trustee is supported even in the absence of 
the express Utah statutory authority. As a result, Reynolds' contrary argument is unavailing 
and fails to provide a basis for reversal of the trial court's decision. 
III. REYNOLDS' ASSERTIONS THAT THE NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE 
PROCESS WAS VOID IS AN ERRONEOUS STATEMENT OF UTAH LAW 
APPLICABLE TO NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURES 
Reynolds argued in the trial court that any action taken by Woodall was "without 
authority, and void", and makes the same argument on appeal premised upon the timing of 
the recording of the Substitution of Trustee. Reynolds relies on the this same argument to 
claim that Reynolds could ignore the recording of the Notice of Default or delivery of the 
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notice of trustee's sale by Woodall. By her rationale, she could ignore these statutory notices 
notwithstanding her undisputed payment default, take no action to enjoin the foreclosure sale 
noticed by Woodall, and then subsequently claim entitlement to set aside the completed 
nonjudicial foreclosure sale. In addition to her complete misapprehension of the ratification 
authority, Reynolds' argument also ignores Utah law regarding the validity of nonjudicial 
foreclosure sales in light of allegations of statutory noncompliance. 
In Timm v. Dewsnup, the borrower contended that the trustee gave defective notice 
of the trustee's sale, entitling her to an order setting it aside. Timm v. Dewsnup, 86 P.3d 699, 
705 (Utah.2003). Specifically, she asserted that Title 57-1-26(2) required sending notice by 
certified or registered mail when an address for such notice is properly recorded or is 
included in the trust deed. Id. The deed of trust in that case included only a general delivery 
address which did not permit delivery of notice by certified or registered mail. Id- Thus, 
while the trustee technically did not comply with this mailing requirement, the parties 
presented evidence at trial establishing that Mrs. Dewsnup had actual notice of the 
foreclosure sale, including her filing of motion to stay the sale one month in advance of the 
foreclosure and her actual attendance at the sale. Id. The Court found that "[w]hatever 
irregularities Mrs. Dewsnup may allege in the technicalities of the notice requirement, they 
are immaterial if she does not demonstrate that she was unable to protect her interests, or if 
there were a resulting 'effect of chilling the bidding and causing an inadequacy of price.'" 
Id. at 706. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court in Timm v. Dewsnup affirmed the trial 
court determination that notice of the foreclosure was not defective. Id. 
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In ruling that the notice defect caused by the lack of certified or registered mailing 
constituted an immaterial error, the Timm v. Dewsnup court cited to its earlier decision in 
Concepts. Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Serv.. Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah. 1987). Concepts 
explained that while Title 57 of the Utah Code sets forth strict notice requirements, 
immaterial errors would not affect the sufficiency of the notice or sale: 
The purpose of strict notice requirements in a nonjudicial sale of property 
secured by trust deed is to inform persons with an interest in the property of 
the pending sale of the property, so that they may act to protect those interests. 
The objective of the notice is to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If that 
objective is attained, immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the 
sufficiency of the notice or the sale made pursuant thereto. 
Concepts at 1159. The Concepts court further found that the party challenging the validity 
of the sale bears the burden of proof, and that defects in notice that will warrant setting aside 
the sale "must be those that would have the effect of chilling the bidding and causing an 
inadequacy of price. The remedy of setting aside the sale will be applied only in cases which 
reach unjust extremes." Id. 
Based upon her admissions in the complaint and amended complaint, as well as Timm 
v. Dewsnup and Concepts, Reynolds could not state a claim to declare the Trustee's Sale 
valid as a matter of law. In the trial court, Reynolds did not dispute that she had defaulted in 
payments or that she received contact from more than one trustee seeking to foreclose. 
Instead, she argued that she was entitled to disregard notices from Woodall because she had 
not received a substitution of trustee from him. She cannot sustain an argument that bid 
chilling occurred because a third party purchaser acquired the property at the foreclosure sale, 
and she did not assert an inadequate price resulted from the alleged defect in the foreclosure 
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process. Consequently, she cannot establish a material defect sufficient to void the 
foreclosure sale pursuant to Timm v. Dewsnup and Concepts. 
In addition, the defect that Reynolds argues invalidates the nonjudicial foreclosure 
sale, namely the timing of the recording of the substitution of trustee, has a statutory cure that 
the beneficiary satisfied in the case at issue. Specifically, Citibank ratified and confirmed that 
the Notice of Default, Notice of Trustee's Sale, and sale conducted by Woodall were 
authorized and approved by it. Citibank ratified and confirmed these actions in the format 
provided for in Utah Code 57-l-22(l)(c). The fact that the Utah legislature created a remedy 
for the timing of the recording of the Substitution of Trustee makes the case at bar an even 
stronger case for finding that no material error in the foreclosure process existed. 
Therefore, Reynolds' bold assertion of a legally void foreclosure process does not 
comport with specific Utah law on the issue. Accordingly, Reynolds did not and could not 
allege that foreclosure sale at issue was invalid as matter of law under Timm v. Dewsnup and 
Concepts, meaning this court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the first amended 
complaint without leave to amend. 
/././ 
/././ 
/././ 
/././ 
/././ 
/././ 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Woodall respectfully requests that the Court affirm the 
judgment of the trial dismissing Reynolds' first amended complaint without leave to amend, 
and grant such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 
Dated: August 11. 2011 PITE DUNCAN, LLP_- ^ 
E^TERJ. SALMON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee JAMES 
H. WOODALL, TRUSTEE 
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